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Introduction 
 
A foreigner moves to Belgium, and needs a telephone line in his new apartment. 
His Belgian friends wish him good luck, telling him it will take months, unless he 
has some connections in the public telephone company, or knows a politician who 
could intervene for him. The foreigner, not being well-connected, reluctantly 
decides to follow the standard procedure, and visits the telephone company’s office 
the next day. To his surprise, he is the only customer there and is able to file his 
application within 20 minutes, helped by a very friendly employee. One day later, 
his telephone is connected. His friends are amazed. Pleasantly surprised about this 
fast service, he goes back to the telephone company’s office, taking a bottle of his 
native country’s wine for the friendly and helpful employee, and asked the 
employee how comes his telephone was connected that fast, while everyone told 
him it would take months. The employee smiles and tells him, ‘well, you know, 
you were the first customer in weeks following the normal procedure, and not 
having some local politician call us. We really appreciated that, and decided to 
connect your telephone right away’. 
This joke, emergent from the 1980s, illustrates how political and other 
‘connections’ have been a central element in the functioning of public services in 
Belgium. Belgium has had an image of being a corrupt country for a long time 
  
(Maesschalck, 2002; De Winter, 2003). A number of high-profile corruption 
scandals in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to this image, and the structure of 
the party-political system has been a major factor in some of these cases (De 
Winter, 2000). Recently, however, there appears to have been a positive evolution 
(Van de Walle, 2004b). 
In this chapter, we use a representative survey of 3168 Flemish citizens to 
analyze the determinants of perceptions of administrative and political corruption. 
We will show that citizens’ perceptions of corruption are embedded in general 
attitudes towards government and that subjective corruption indicators may be 
heavily influenced by predispositions towards government, and therefore do not 
reflect the respondents’ personal experience with corruption. Because many 
citizens do not have frequent personal experience with corrupt practices, the 
answer they give in surveys is influenced by other factors. The absence of an 
experiential basis allows respondents considerable freedom to take certain other 
attitudinal aspects into account. This creates problems of comparability and invites 
respondents to broaden their frame of reference to whatever factor they wish when 
giving an opinion on corruption. Perceptions of administrative corruption, hence, 
both contribute to the general attitudes towards the administration and government 
as well as being a consequence of them (Van de Walle, 2004c).  
In the first section we briefly present some of the available survey material on 
citizens’ perception of public sector corruption in Belgium. Using data from a 
general survey administered in Flanders (Northern part of Belgium) in 2003, we 
subsequently analyze determinants of general perceptions of corruption and 
unethical behavior. We show that these perceptions are to a large extent influenced 
by feelings of political alienation and general attitudes towards government. It is 
therefore difficult to distinguish cause and effect between trust in government and 
perceptions of corruption. We then will show that general perceptions of corruption 
should not be seen as an expression of individual experience. Parallels become 
  
apparent with how citizens evaluate government services, where a disconnection 
seems to exist between generally positive personal bureaucratic encounters and 
more negative attitudes towards public services in general. We end by reviewing 
possibilities for avoiding ‘contamination’ of perceptions of corruption by general 
attitudes towards government, and for developing indicators that better measure 
actual corruption. 
 
Perceived corruption in Belgium 
 
By means of an introduction, we briefly present some of the available survey data 
on citizens’ perception of corruption in Belgium. The 1995 ISPO General Election 
Study (Beerten, Billiet, Carton, & Swyngedouw, 1997) revealed that 29 percent of 
Belgians thought politicians to be more corrupt than other individuals, while 65.5 
percent did not see a difference. This study also revealed that citizens have more 
problems with politicians who demand bribes or payments for granting government 
contracts than with politicians who accept money for a contract. A politician using 
bribes for funding his or her personal election campaign is considered more 
reprehensible than is a politician who transfers the money to his or her political 
party, although 73.9 percent of respondents overall viewed accepting bribes as 
unacceptable1.  
The best-known source for corruption indicators is the Transparency 
International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This index ranks countries 
                                                 
1 ‘Hardly acceptable’ and ‘never acceptable’. Of the remaining respondents, 17.8 
per cent stated this is ‘sometimes acceptable’, and 5.4 per cent stated that accepting 
money and giving it to one’s party is ‘completely acceptable’. 
  
based on perceived corruption among politicians and public officials2. Even though 
the CPI does not lend itself to making time-series comparisons, the trend for 
Belgium in recent years is quite clear: Since 1999 there has been an unambiguous 
positive trend (the lower the score, the higher perceived corruption). The score 
does not return to 1980s level, but this is probably due to changes in the method of 
measurement and the fact that data for Belgium and Luxembourg have not always 
been disaggregated. Luxembourg generally ranks higher than Belgium. 
Figure 1: Belgium in the Corruption Perceptions Index 
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Source: Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 
In 2005, Belgium ranked 19th among the least corrupt countries (in a total of 133 
countries). This puts the country on a par with Ireland and higher than, for 
example, Spain and Japan. Still, Belgium performs worse than many other EU15 
countries, including its neighboring countries. Compared to 2004, the country 
declined in the rankings, even though this change is probably not large enough to 
be significant.  
Additional information on Belgian citizens’ attitude towards corruption can be 
                                                 
2 www.transparency.org, note that CPI scores cannot just be compared on a year-
to-year basis, as composition has changed a number of times. 
  
found in the 1999-2000 European Values Study. One question was about the 
perceived occurrence of taking bribes. Table 1 shows the answers in a series of 
European countries and indicates significant differences between countries. In 
Belgium, 27.8 percent of the respondents report that almost all or many of their 
compatriots accept bribes. This percentage is comparable to that in Austria, 
Germany and the UK, yet higher than that found in Finland or Luxemburg. In Italy, 
however, this percentage peaks at 41.2 per cent. 
Table 1: According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following? 
Accepting a bribe in the course of their duties? 
% almost all Many some almost none
BE 4.8 23.0 63.5 8.7 
AT 2.4 30.4 63.3 3.9 
DE 5.1 27.9 61.2 5.8 
FI 2.3 20.3 64.5 13.0 
IT 7.4 43.8 46.5 2.3 
LU 0.9 9.7 38.1 33.0 
UK 1.8 29.4 60.0 8.7 
 
Source: European Values Study, only results for EU15 countries (Halman, 
2001) 
 
Another question asked to what extent citizens considered it justified for 
someone to accept a bribe in the course of his or her duties. The percentage of 
respondents that considered accepting a bribe to never be justified was 77.7 percent 
in 1981, 78.6 in 1990, and 84.1 percent in 1999. Figure 2 illustrates how the 
Transparency International and European Values Study findings are related. 
 
  
Figure 2: Perceptions of corruption (TI) and justifiability of accepting bribes 
(EVS) in the EU-countries 
 
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999, 
where ‘10’ means that corruption is perceived to be very low; European 
Values Study (1999-2000 wave). ‘Please tell me for each of the following 
statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their 
duties.’ Scale 1 (never) to 10 (always), mean score (Halman, 2001) 
Considering bribes to be unjustified does not lead to perceptions of corruption 
to be lower in a particular country, though there are exceptions. Perceptions 
regarding accepting bribes is actually quite similar across most countries, despite 
differences in CPI scores. In only a few Central-European countries is accepting 
bribes considered to be somewhat more justified, yet the differences remain small. 
  
  
What determines perceptions of corruption? An analysis 
 
For this section, we use data from the Werken aan de Overheid survey (WADO-
Working on Government), which was administered as part of a research project 
commissioned by the ministry of the Flemish Community (2000-2004, 
www.kuleuven.be/trust). The questionnaire dealt with citizens’ attitudes towards 
the public sector and contained items on socio-demographics, citizens and public 
services, citizens and politics, and citizens and society. Participants were 
inhabitants of the Flemish Region (aged 18-85). Three surveys were administered: 
a face-to-face survey (2002, n=1248, response rate 68.2 percent), an initial mail 
survey (2002, n=2166, response rate 63.5 percent), and a second mail survey 
(2003, n=3168, response rate 61.9 percent3). We will only report data from the 
2003 survey here (Van de Walle, Kampen, Maddens, & Bouckaert, 2004). 
Questionnaires were sent with two-week intervals. Fifteen successive waves 
covered a period of half a year (third and fourth quarters of 2003). In this way the 
impact of events on citizens’ opinions could be measured and long-term impacts 
and evolutions analyzed. We do not, however, analyze trends in this chapter. 
Respondents each received three mailings: an introductory letter, the questionnaire 
with postage-paid return envelope and a reminder. As an incentive, a limited 
number of gifts (approx. 0.5 to 1 percent of respondents) was given to respondents 
by means of a lottery. 
The survey contained a number of issues related to corruption and favoritism, 
five of which are analyzed here in greater detail. Three of these articulate 
corruption-related issues, the other two focus on issues of equal treatment. 
                                                 
3 In the 2003 survey, 25-44 aged are underrepresented, 45-60 aged tended to return 
the questionnaire more often, and the +70 category is again underrepresented. 
Response was higher in rural areas. 
  
Table 2: Perceptions of unethical behavior in the public sector in Flanders 
% totally 
disagree 
disagree not agree, not 
disagree 
agree totally 
agree 
Civil servants are more 
corrupt than other people 
8.4 28.7 38.2 19.0 5.7 
Politicians are more corrupt 
than other people 
3.0 18.4 36.2 29.4 13.1 
You need 'connections' to 
get something done by 
government or the public 
administration 
2.1 11.3 30.5 40.5 15.7 
All users of public services 
are treated equally 
10.9 40.2 26.1 16.7 6.1 
Users of public services 
always get what they're 
entitled to 
7.8 35.4 35.5 18.6 2.7 
Source: Werken aan de Overheid (WADO) 2003, n=3168. 
 
Surprisingly, 56.2 percent of the respondents believe an individual needs 
connections to get something done from government or public administrators; only 
13.3 percent disagree. The results are somewhat more encouraging in response to 
the question regarding corruption: just under a quarter of respondents believe that 
civil servants are more corrupt than other people. Politicians, however, are 
perceived to be more corrupt than other people by 42.4 percent of participants in 
the survey. Responses to these three questions are strongly correlated. 
  
 Table 3: Perceived ethical treatment of citizens, correlations 
 users get 
what 
entitled to 
civil 
servants 
corrupt 
need 
connections 
politicians 
corrupt 
users treated equally 0.51** -0.08** -0.17** -0.13** 
users get what entitled 
to 
 -0,07** -0.16** -0.11** 
civil servants corrupt   0.43** 0.40** 
need connections    0.36** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; Kendall's tau_b 
The correlation table along with a factor analysis confirm that the items are 
measuring different dimensions of ethical treatment. While opinions on corruption 
are quite moderate, there is evidently something wrong with equal treatment. Just 
one out of five respondents agrees that users of public services are treated equally 
and get what they’re entitled to, while over half of the respondents disagree. 
In the next step, we attempt to explain these attitudes by socio-demographic 
characteristics, social attitudes, voting behavior, and media exposure. Socio-
demographic variables are gender, level of education (six levels), and age (six 
categories from 18-24 to 65+). Social attitudes are individualism (based on two 
items: ‘Humanity, brotherhood and solidarity are all nonsense. Everybody has to 
take care of themselves first and defend their own interests’ and ‘People should 
always pursue their personal pleasure, and shouldn’t think too much about others’), 
and authoritarianism (also based on two items: ‘Obedience and respect for 
authority are the two most important virtues children have to learn’ and ‘What we 
need is strong leaders who tell us what to do’). Voting behavior is based on the 
question ‘Suppose there are national elections next Sunday. Which would be your 
preferred political party?’ This variable has been recoded into seven dummies, each 
referring to one of the main parties; AGALEV (greens), CD&V (Christian-
democrats), N-VA (Flemish nationalists), SP-A (social democrats), Spirit (Flemish 
  
nationalist and social democrat), Vlaams Blok (extreme right) and VLD (liberals). 
The three media variables measure whether an individual reads reputable 
newspapers, watches the news on public television, and/or watches news on 
commercial television. The five dependent variables have been recoded into 
trichotomous variables. Table 4 gives the results of the multivariate ordinal logit 
regression models. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of perceptions of ethical behavior: ordinal regression 
models 
 Civil 
servants 
corrupt 
Politicians 
corrupt 
Need 
connectio
ns 
All 
treated 
equally 
Get 
what 
entitled 
to 
SEX (0=male, 
1=female) 
0.185* 0.050 0.21** -0.024 0.143* 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073) 
EDUCATION -0.128*** -0.082* -
0.115*** 
-0.020 -0.073* 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
AGE 0.021 0.012 -0.001 0.007 0.032 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
AUTHORITARIA
NISM 
0.041** 0.025 0.038** 0.047*** 0.050*
** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
INDIVIDUALIS
M 
0.159*** 0.142*** 0.096*** -0.002 0.048*
** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
PARTY: agalev 0.041 -0.027 -0.514* 0.036 0.266 
 (0.23) (0.225) (0.229) (0.232) (0.228) 
PARTY: cd&v -0.348** -0.174 -0.297* 0.193 0.233 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.139) (0.133) (0.131) 
PARTY: n-va -0.103 0.152 0.009 -0.258 -0.080 
 (0.213) (0.213) (0.221) (0.223) (0.215) 
  
PARTY: sp-a -0.172 -0.475*** -0.392** 0.373** 0.343*
* 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.138) (0.132) (0.131) 
PARTY: spirit 0.356 -0.128 0.174 0.201 0.361 
 (0.212) (0.217) (0.238) (0.212) (0.208) 
PARTY: vlaams 
blok 
0.393** 0.617*** 0.265 -0.067 -0.241 
 (0.142) (0.152) (0.16) (0.146) (0.144) 
PARTY: vld -0.188 -0.671*** -0.238 0.115 0.167 
 (0.129) (0.131) (0.138) (0.132) (0.129) 
QUALITY 
NEWSPAPERS 
-0.166 -0.190 -0.240* 0.009 -0.098 
 (0.108) (0.105) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106) 
TV NEWS public 
TV 
-0.137 0.019 -0.233 0.185 -0.064 
 (0.134) (0.138) (0.145) (0.135) (0.133) 
TV NEWS 
commercial TV 
0.152 0.295* 0.087 0.252 0.043 
 (0.132) (0.135) (0.141) (0.133) (0.132) 
      
N 2742 2747 2749 2731 2735 
Nagelkerke 
pseudo R² 
0.148 0.143 0.098 0.017 0.040 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
The strongest models are these explaining attitudes towards the items ‘civil 
servants are more corrupt than normal people’ and ‘politicians are more corrupt 
than normal people’. Opinions about political corruption are strongly influenced by 
party preference. Extreme right voters are more likely to think that politicians are 
more corrupt than other people. Just eight percent of the extreme right voters 
disagree with the statement that politicians are more corrupt than normal people. 
Social-democrats and liberals are less likely to think politicians are more corrupt 
than other individuals. At the time of data collection, these were the two main 
  
parties in the regional and federal governments, but an alternative explanation 
could be that certain traditional voter segments of these parties have defected rather 
early to the extreme right. Respondents with individualistic attitudes are more 
likely to label politicians as corrupt, as is a lower education, and a propensity to 
watch the TV news on a commercial TV channel, rather than on public TV. 
Perceptions of administrative corruption tend to be influenced by being 
female, lower educated, scoring higher on individualism, and a somewhat higher 
authoritarian attitude. As is the case for perceptions of political corruption, a party 
preference for the extreme right leads to a higher perceived corruption. Voting for 
Christian-democrats leads to lower perceived administrative corruption. Despite 
the number of explanatory variables, the models for political and administrative 
corruption explain just 14.3 and 14.8 per cent of total variation. 
The models for equal treatment and for getting what one is entitled to have 
very low R squares, yet there are a number of significant relationships. Stronger 
authoritarian attitudes co-exist with stronger beliefs in equal treatment. 
Individualism leads to a higher belief that everyone will in the end get what they’re 
entitled to when interacting with public services; Perceptions and expectations of 
equal treatment are higher among supporters of the social-democratic party, a party 
whose ideology stresses equality. There are some effects of education and gender: 
females and lower educated persons are somewhat more inclined to believe that 
public service users will get that to which they are entitled. 
Christian-democrats, Greens, and Social-democrats are less inclined to believe 
connections are needed to get something done, while individualism and a lower 
education leads to a higher perceived need of connections, just as does being 
female. Those reading reputable newspapers do not agree that connections are 
needed. Overall, again, the model’s explanatory power is quite low. 
When we only look at the three models directly dealing with corruption 
(administrative and political, and the perception that connections are needed), a 
  
lower education, high individualism, and a preference for the extreme right are 
important determinants. All these variables are frequently encountered in the 
research on political alienation. It is thus likely that, instead of reflecting opinions 
on or experiences with corruption, the dependent variables could in fact be 
considered as expressions of this alienation. Stating that connections are needed, or 
that civil servants are corrupt may therefore be the result of actual experienced 
corruption, but it may also be part of a general (negative) predisposition towards 
government. We expand our model, to include a number of political alienation 
variables. All alienation variables load on a single factor: 
• Voting is useless; the parties do what they want to do anyway 
• Most politicians promise a lot, but don’t do anything 
• Most of our politicians are competent people, who know what they are 
doing 
• Parliament can best be abolished, since it does not solve any problem 
• The present political system is rotten 
• To what extent do you trust government? 
All variables have been recoded from five to three categories. Because media 
exposure was not relevant in the basic model, we drop it here. 
 
Table 5: The effects of political alienation on corruption, ordinal regression 
models 
 Civil servants 
corrupt 
Politicians 
corrupt 
Need 
connections 
SEX (0=male, 
1=female) 
0.233** 0.108 0.244** 
  (0.074) (0.078) (0.079) 
EDUCATION -0.108** -0.025 -0.072* 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) 
AGE -0.049 -0.035 -0.061* 
  
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) 
AUTHORITARIANISM 0.044** 0.012 0.041** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
INDIVIDUALISM 0.116*** 0.078*** 0.041** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
PARTY: agalev 0.400 0.621* -0.156 
  (0.232) (0.241) (0.231) 
PARTY: cd&v -0.112 0.055 -0.088 
  (0.132) (0.139) (0.141) 
PARTY: n-va 0.029 0.244 0.140 
  (0.215) (0.224) (0.225) 
PARTY: sp-a 0.322* 0.302* 0.124 
  (0.134) (0.141) (0.143) 
PARTY: spirit 0.726** 0.359 0.547* 
  (0.214) (0.228) (0.244) 
PARTY: vlaams blok 0.238 0.283 0.001 
  (0.142) (0.158) (0.161) 
PARTY: vld 0.329* 0.090 0.301* 
  (0.131) (0.138) (0.141) 
VOTING USELESS 0.093 0.207*** 0.146* 
  (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) 
POLITICIANS 
PROMISE 
0.205** 0.894*** 0.264*** 
  (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) 
COMPETENT -0.226*** -0.426*** -0.120 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.061) 
ABOLISH PARL. 0.344*** 0.255*** 0.250**** 
 (0.058) (0.063) (0.065) 
SYST. ROTTEN 0.245*** 0.595*** 0.404*** 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) 
TRUSTGOV -0.512*** -0.347*** -0.607*** 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) 
    
N 2840 2852 2842 
Nagelkerke pseudo R² .256 .421 .238 
  
R² increasea .118 .286 .149 
a increase compared to basic model without media variables; Note: standard errors 
in parenthesis; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
In all three cases, almost all alienation variables are significant determinants 
for the corruption and ethics perceptions. In one of the two cases where 
relationships are not significant at the p<0.05 level, there is border significance. 
Adding the alienation variables leads to a substantial and even sometimes very 
substantial increase in explained variance (R²). Together with some party 
preference variables, alienation accounts for most of the variance in the corruption 
and ethics perceptions. The impact of extreme right voting, which was relevant in 
the basic models, disappears, possibly due to the fact that this voting behavior is 
partly determined by alienation. 
 
What about causality? 
 
The classical, mechanistic explanation for this kind of findings is that citizens feel 
alienated from their political or administrative system because they perceive it as 
being corrupt. In this chapter however, we defend the hypothesis that perceptions 
of corruption are in fact expressions of a more general attitude towards 
government. A further implication of this viewpoint is that the attitudes as 
measured in our survey cannot be considered as adequate reflections of actual 
corrupt practices. We briefly return to this second point towards the end of the 
chapter. 
In previous research on citizens’ perceptions of public services and on 
citizens’ trust in institutions we have shown that there is a substantial degree of 
generalization in respondents’ answers to quite general questions (Van de Walle, 
2004c). Trust in a certain institution quite often coincides with trust in most 
  
institutions. Dissatisfaction with government in general often coincides with 
dissatisfaction with a broad range of issues. A person with a negative attitude 
towards government is also more likely to complain about high taxes, corruption, 
or administrative inefficiency. Certain general predispositions towards government 
influence most attitudes towards government-related aspects.  
This has important implications for the interpretation of survey findings like 
the ones we have presented above, and for building explanatory models. Failing to 
recognize this generalization of negative or positive attitudes towards government 
often results in models that are very good at proving that what one wanted to prove 
in the first place. Correlations between general negative attitude towards 
government and more specific elements of dissatisfaction (taxes, corruption …) do 
not necessarily mean that high taxes or high levels of perceived corruption are to be 
seen as causes of or explanations for this dissatisfaction. Instead, these specific 
elements could be interpreted as expressions of this general attitude. It would thus 
be premature to look at the models in Table 5 and to consider citizens’ political 
alienation as resulting from high levels of corruption. Instead, perceived corruption 
and perceived unethical behavior are an expression of this political alienation. By 
presenting the perceptions of corruption and unethical behavior as dependent 
variables, we have further illustrated our point. 
Proving causality, however, is not common in social methodology, and often is 
simply impossible. Yet, causal constructions are an important rhetorical device. 
Hence Ruscio’s criticism on the all-too-easy prescriptions for restoring citizens’ 
trust in government:  
 
Reactions to the decline (of trust, svdw) have certainly not been lacking, 
but they typically follow a predictable formula: an analyst’s alarmed 
response which is used to justify a set of prescriptions favored by the 
analyst. Trust can be restored by - take your pick - term limits, balanced 
  
budgets, regulatory reform, reinventing government, campaign reform, 
responsible journalism, stronger political parties, a third political party, 
vigorous state and local government, constraints on lobbying or an end to 
divided government (Ruscio, 1997: 454). 
 
Limiting corruption and the introduction of an ethics infrastructure could easily be 
added to this list.  
 
Do general perceptions reflect personal experience? 
 
For citizens, it is not easy to base their perceptions about or attitude towards 
corruption on personal experience. Fragmented evidence suggests that actual 
individual acts of corruption are quite limited in most Western countries. In the 
International Crime Victims Survey for instance, a question is included on actual 
experienced corruption in relations with, for example customs officers, police 
officers and inspectors or other government officials4. Frequencies for these items 
are generally low to extremely low (Van Kesteren, Mayhew, & Nieuwbeerta, 
2000). In our own survey, we included an item on politicians’ constituency service 
and the extent to which citizens have approached a politician during the last four 
years for solving a personal problem5. Just 2.5 percent of respondents mentioned 
                                                 
4 Q290: ‘In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among government of 
public officials. During 1999, has any government official, for instance a customs 
officer, a police officer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to 
pay a bribe or his or her services?’ Answer = yes/no. In Belgium there were 9 ‘yes’ 
answers on 2501 respondents in the 1999 survey. 
5 ‘People sometimes call on politicians for solving personal problems. Did you 
during the last four year call on a politician’s constituency service for solving some 
  
more than one contact, while 9.6 percent of respondents admitted having 
approached a politician in the four preceding years. Using politicians’ constituency 
service does of course not equal corruption. Other methods frequently used to 
measure actual corruption rather than perceptions are household surveys, where 
personal stories of corrupt experiences are shared and recorded within specific 
groups. The method is less often used in developed countries, probably because of 
the lower occurrence of corrupt acts, and costs of collecting meaningful data. 
Absence of personal experience forces survey respondents in general surveys 
to relate to other elements or information to form their opinion on corruption. The 
number of respondents whose answers are related to corruption based on recently 
experienced corruption is likely to be extremely low. Reactions to a statement such 
as ‘you need connections to get something done from government’ do not 
necessarily have a specific referential basis, but more probably refer to information 
                                                                                                                            
personal problem?’ We use the Dutch word ‘dienstbetoon’, which is generally 
translated as constituency services, but which is in fact something more specific. 
‘Dienstbetoon’ refers to the waning Belgian politicians’ habit for holding office 
every week or month somewhere in their constituency to meet individual citizens. 
Traditionally, this practice has been associated with corruption, for example 
because citizens visited politicians to arrange jobs for family members or to get 
building permits. Nowadays, however, the practice has evolved into some kind of 
front-office social work, where politicians are considered easier to approach than 
are certain national administrations. Politicians are now believed to limit their 
‘dienstbetoon’ to showing citizens the correct administration they should contact 
with a certain problem or to referring citizens to the ombudsman. Of the 
respondents in our survey who had approached a politician, 33.9 per cent stated it 
helped solving the problem, while 49.9 per cent declared it did not. The others (29.9 
per cent) took a neutral position. 
  
about government in general that is present in the respondent’s mind (Zaller, 1996). 
Most probably this information concurs with general attitudes towards government 
and with the general stereotypes of government and administrations (Van de Walle, 
2004a).  
Here, a parallel with research on citizens’ perception of public services 
surfaces. For several decades, scholars have repeatedly stumbled on a number of 
apparent contradictions in citizens’ opinion about public services. One 
contradiction deals with process. Citizens dislike inefficiency but are equally 
dissatisfied when delivery of services is ruthlessly efficient (Blau, 1956:14). 
Citizens complain about cumbersome red tape and paper-based interaction, but 
wouldn’t like either that the official would forget precious details about the specific 
encounter (du Gay, 2000). Both vices and virtues of bureaucratic systems are used 
to fuel the traditional dislike of the bureaucracy (Hill, 1992): corruption itself as 
well as the bureaucratic impersonality that results from anti-corruption measures 
may give rise to dissatisfaction. An inefficient police force creates dissatisfaction, 
but so does a police force that is too eager issuing parking tickets. Two dominant 
images prevail: the lazy, incompetent bureaucrat vs. the power-hungry, 
manipulative civil servant. It is not quite obvious how these two images may 
reasonably co-exist. 
The other contradiction, perhaps more important here, deals with evaluation. 
While many citizens dislike the public administration in general, they are actually 
quite satisfied with many concrete services. Citizens generally evaluate specific 
and concrete services in a more positive way than is the case for government in 
general or for general concepts such as ‘the public administration.’ The general 
image of the bureaucracy does not correspond to the evaluation citizens make 
about their own experience with public services (‘bureaucratic encounters’). Public 
administration scholars started to write about this in the 1970s. One of the earliest 
extensive studies on the issue was a large-scale study by Katz et al. (1977) on 
  
differences in the evaluation of public and private services. They asked respondents 
to evaluate public and private sector services in general, as well as a recently used 
public and private sector service. When respondents had to compare public and 
private sector services, they indeed rated private sector services higher. However, 
when the comparison concerned the private and public sector service that was used 
most recently, differences between the evaluation of public and private sector 
services disappeared. Goodsell devoted an entire book (The Case for Bureaucracy - 
1983) to the issue of divergence between evaluations of concrete bureaucratic 
encounters and the general public attitude vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. Most of 
Goodsell’s observations are echoed in other research and articles as well (Grunow, 
1981), and his theoretical explanations do not differ greatly from Katz et al.’s 
research on bureaucratic encounters. Klages (1981) referred to German research 
indicating differences in citizens’ evaluation of civil servants in general and 
employees who provide specific public services. Hill (1992: 20), in his chapter 
entitled Taking bureaucracy seriously wants to know why citizens state they were 
treated fairly by the administration, while they don’t think governmental offices are 
giving fair treatment. Although Hill uses some new survey material, his approach 
does not introduce much more than Goodsell. Hill’s evidence found that citizens 
tend to agree with negative statements about the bureaucracy when these are 
unrelated to bureaucratic performance and vague enough to serve as an outlet for 
the stereotypical anti-bureaucratic images (Hill, 1992: 22). The explanation lies 
therefore not in the degree of generalizations, as can be concluded from reading 
Goodsell, but rather on the symbolic content of concepts and objects and not on the 
level of abstraction: ‘The conventional wisdom in political science and social 
psychology has been that abstract attitude objects are processed differently than 
concrete ones. The simple symbolic politics view assumes that processing of 
political symbols depends on the evaluations associated with them, not on the 
symbol’s level of abstraction’ (Sears, 2001: 20). The abstract objects studied in 
  
public administration (government, bureaucracy, civil servants) often bear negative 
symbolic content, and this content is being reflected when respondents are asked to 
give an opinion on the administration or bureaucratic ethics and corruption. 
Because of the high level of abstraction of the concept (public administration) or 
the low level of personal experience (corruption), respondents form an answer that 
is plausible because it is compatible with the general symbolic content and their 
own general attitude towards government. 
 
What about perceptions of corruption? 
 
How do we find these processes in perceptions of corruption? In our WADO 
survey, we also asked respondents to indicate their level of trust in a series of 
institutions (1=very little; 5=a lot). At the beginning of the questionnaire, a general 
item on trust in government was also included6. Table 6 shows how the general 
opinion on corruption correlates quite strongly with trust in government in general 
and with trust in more general and diffuse institutions, while correlations with 
rather specific institutions are considerably weaker. The correlation between 
perceptions of corruption and general trust in government is the highest, directly 
followed by the quite generally phrased items such trust in the Flemish 
administration, Federal administration and municipal administration. At the bottom 
of the list are very specific services such as the railway company, the postal service 
etc., where correlations are very small, yet still significant. A traditional 
explanation would be that citizens tend to associate institutions such as the Flemish 
or Federal administration more with corruption than is the case for services such as 
the postal service or the national railways. 
                                                 
6 General question near the start of the survey: ‘To what extent do you trust 
government’ (1-5 scale) 
  
Table 6: Trust and corruption: correlations  
You need connections to get something done 
Trust  Correlation 
Coefficient 
Trust  Correlation 
Coefficient 
Government (general) -0.31 European 
Commission 
-0.17 
Flemish administration -0.26 Police -0.17 
Federal administration -0.25 Courts/justice system -0.15 
Municipal 
administration 
-0.23 Educational system -0.12 
Flemish Parliament -0.20 Public transport (bus, 
tram) 
-0.11 
Flemish Government -0.20 Flemish employment 
agency 
-0.10 
Belgian Parliament -0.20 Public television -0.10 
Belgian Government -0.20 Refuse collection -0.08 
Flemish political 
parties 
-0.18 Army -0.06 
Walloon political 
parties 
-0.18 Postal service -0.06 
College of mayor and 
aldermen 
-0.17 Railway company -0.05 
Source: Werken aan de Overheid (WADO) 2003, n=3168, Kendall’s Tau b, all 
correlations significant. 
 
It would be incorrect however to infer from these findings that citizens 
experience or have experienced more frequent occurrences of corruption in these 
non-specific institutions (‘the administration’, ‘government’). In fact, these 
correlations merely confirm what we have described earlier. Even though we have 
not measured perceptions of corruption in very specific and concrete governmental 
institutions, we can quite confidently state that survey respondents will report 
lower corruption in many specific institutions than they will for the public 
administration or government in general. Exceptions to this ‘general rule’ will then 
  
probably be services where there have recently been corruption scandals or 
services that traditionally had a very negative image. This means that the opinion 
on corruption is probably part of a general opinion about government and not so 
much the result of actual experience. General surveys do not distinguish whether 
these opinions are part of the general attitude towards government or resultant from 
actual experienced corruption.  
The relationship between general opinions about corruption, and general 
attitudes towards government are also visible in a more international analysis. 
Figure 3 shows the levels of confidence in the civil service in the EU countries 
(excluding Malta and Cyprus), as measured in the European Values Study, and 
these countries’ scores on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index in the same year. Even though imperfect, there is a strong correlation 
between both indicators (Pearson correlation = .506). 
 
Figure 3: Confidence in the civil service and perceptions of corruption 
 
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999 and 
European Values Study 1999: % ‘a great deal’ and ‘quite a lot’ of confidence. 
  
Again, this figure may be seen as indicating that corruption drives down 
confidence in the civil service, but it can also be interpreted as supporting our view 
that both perceptions of corruption, and confidence in the civil service, are derived 
from a general view of government. There are no reliable criteria however, to 
decide whether and when a corruption perception indicator reflects generalized 
views of government or actual experience with corruption. 
 
A need for better measurement of corruption? 
 
While perceptions of corruption as a factor of general attitudes toward government 
are an interesting indicator for researchers, most practitioners and policy-makers 
are interested in actual corruption. This chapter clearly showed that general items 
on perceived corruption risk to be ‘contaminated’ by general predispositions 
towards government. Generally, there are two possibilities for isolating citizens’ 
perceptions of corruption from general predispositions toward government. One is 
to avoid broad and general questions and instead to focus on specific and concrete 
situations. The other is to do away with measuring perceptions altogether and to 
step up efforts to develop objective indicators of corruption. 
 
1. Specific measurement 
We have shown that general perceptions of corruption correlate with levels of trust 
in quite general institutions. The more specific an item in a questionnaire, the 
narrower the respondent’s framework of reference for answering the question 
becomes. This may help in filtering predispositions. A general question such as ‘is 
the public administration corrupt’ invites respondents not only to think about recent 
experience, but also to think about all possible administrations, about bureaucratic 
stereotypes, even about politicians, etc. A more narrowly defined question such as 
‘did you personally experience corruption in service Y during the past three 
  
encounters’ drastically confines the framework of reference to service Y and helps 
to exclude many of the general predispositions towards government or 
administrations. Specific measurement of corruption should therefore disaggregate 
the general corruption items and ask questions on corruption with regard to many 
different specific services and with regard to many different expressions of 
corruption. Some examples are the Transparency International Global Corruption 
Barometer, where respondents were asked to give their opinion on the presence of 
corruption in a series of sectors. They also could indicate the amount of bribes paid 
by one’s household, and the reason why this was done (www.transparency.org). 
The barometer did not, however, link actual behavior to specific sectors. Even 
more detailed are household surveys, some also conducted by Transparency 
International. In these surveys, detailed questions about corrupt practices and 
experiences are included. These questions refer to concrete interactions with 
government services and officials. For policy makers such a specific measurement 
is also important, because it shows them where and how corruption is manifest and 
hence facilitates action. Policymakers who use general corruption indicators can in 
fact only use this information to decide on general measures to combat corruption, 
without being able to establish priorities for action. Most of these very detailed 
surveys are conducted in developing countries. Lower occurrence of corrupt 
practices in developed countries would require very large samples to gather 
significant data, thus rendering them somewhat more impractical. 
 
2. Objective measurement 
Possibilities for measuring corruption objectively are sparsely reported in the 
literature. One approach counts the number of cases related to corruption before the 
courts. In Belgium, Yante (2003) analyzed the number of lawsuits related to 
corruption. Despite the often-defective judicial statistics, he did find a decrease and 
also observed a tendency for more severe punishment in corruption cases. This 
  
relatively easy approach negates certain aspects, because corruption is essentially 
an illegal and hidden activity (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2003). A falling 
number of lawsuits may also suggest decreasing judicial oversight or more hidden 
corruption. Essentially, effectively measuring corruption is de facto combating 
corruption. 
Kaufmann et al., in their Governance Matters III working paper, refer to a 
small number of studies that attempted to measure corruption directly. They 
mention Di Tella and Shargrodsky (2003), who measure variation in procurement 
prices for medical supplies, where high variation suggests there is corruption 
involved, and Golden and Picci (2005), who compare expenditures for public 
infrastructure with existing inventories, where high discrepancies may hint at 
corruption. 
A third approach is to map incentives and opportunities for corruption (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999), influenced by the demand and supply in the citizen-official 
encounter. Opportunities for asking or giving bribes may be influenced by the level 
of discretion exercised by the civil servant or political decision-makers. Incentives 
are influenced by factors such as the likelihood of being caught, and the savings in 
time and money to be had by circumventing customary procedures, especially 
when the customary procedure is long and expensive with unpredictable outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we analyzed determinants of subjective perceptions of corruption in 
Belgium. Belgium, a country with a somewhat corrupt image, seems to have made 
some progress in dispelling such negative perceptions during the last decade, as 
demonstrated by the country’s Transparency International rankings. In an analysis 
of survey data, we found political alienation to be one of the main determinants of 
citizens’ perception of political and public sector corruption and of unethical 
  
behavior in the administration. This had important implications for both the 
interpretation of the causal link between corruption and other attitudes towards 
government, and for the practice of measuring corruption. General surveys 
revealed that opinions on corruption and unethical behavior are embedded in more 
general attitudes toward government. Unlike the reportedly widespread personal 
experience with public corruption in Belgium, citizens of Western countries hear 
about corruption but research has demonstrated that firsthand experiences remain 
limited, thus emphasizing the geographical and cultural limitations of this study. 
Still, general perceptions of corruption are often used as measures of 
corruption in a country. These general perceptions are useful indicators for 
attitudinal research, and also have a value in mapping a country’s image. There is a 
need however for the development of more objective indicators of corruption, and 
when surveys are used, very specific questions are to be asked, rather than general 
queries. Finally, because perceptions of corruption seem to be an expression of 
general attitudes towards government, we can no longer simply use surveys to 
prove that low levels of trust are a consequence of corruption. Rather, high levels 
of perceived corruption are probably a reflection of low trust. An implication of 
this is that declines in actual corruption will not immediately have an impact on 
citizens’ general perceptions of the occurrence of corruption. 
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